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LOST IN SPACE: LAURENCE TRIBE‘S INVISIBLE 
CONSTITUTION 
Eric J. Segall 
 
For over two hundred years, scholars, judges, and constitutional theor-
ists have debated whether the American people possess fundamental rights 
and liberties beyond those derived from the explicit text of the United 
States Constitution.  As early as 1798, Justices Chase and Iredell differed 
over whether Supreme Court Justices should employ natural law principles 
to decide the cases before them.1  Almost one hundred years later, James 
Bradley Thayer argued for greater judicial deference to political institutions 
by suggesting that judges should invalidate decisions by the elected 
branches only when those decisions were clearly inconsistent with unambi-
guous constitutional text.2  In the 1960‘s, Alexander Bickel wrote of the 
―counter-majoritarian difficulty,‖3 spawning hundreds of law review articles 
written by the legal academy‘s most esteemed scholars trying to justify de-
cisions such as Brown v. Board of Education, Baker v. Carr, and Roe v. 
Wade4 against the charge that the rights protected in those cases could not 
be gleaned through constitutional text and history.5  And in 1975, Thomas 
Grey wrote his seminal article Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?,6 
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scholars on both the left and the right.7  Now, one of the most prominent 
constitutional lawyers of our generation and our chief legal doctrinalist, 
Laurence Tribe, has tried to contribute to this discourse with his book The 
Invisible Constitution.8  Given my inclination to agree with Professor 
Tribe‘s politics, and in light of his substantial reputation as a teacher, scho-
lar, and constitutional litigator, it would be wonderful to report that his new 
book adds to the considerable literature on this subject.  Unfortunately, The 
Invisible Constitution fails to advance the debate. 
Where his writing is transparent, Professor Tribe‘s descriptive account 
of constitutional law, doctrine, and history fails to break new ground.  
Where he fashions new ideas to support his descriptive account, Tribe‘s 
reasoning is often obscure.  Although he presents normative justifications 
for numerous liberal results, his reasoning is not persuasive.  And to the ex-
tent that Professor Tribe is articulating new methods of constitutional inter-
pretation to clarify some of our most difficult controversies—for example, 
the privileged status of privacy over economic freedom—his book employs 
tools that could lead to conclusions opposite from the ones he advocates.  
Professor Tribe is obviously struggling (like the rest of us) with the current 
incoherence of constitutional doctrine and the subjectivity of Supreme 
Court decision making, but there is little in The Invisible Constitution to 
help the reader come to terms with those problems. 
This review explains why Professor Tribe‘s descriptive account is at 
times unoriginal and at other times obscure.  It also suggests that the norma-
tive sections of Tribe‘s book do raise important but often-asked questions 
about nontextual constitutional interpretation, which he then fails to illumi-
nate.  Finally, I explain my belief that Professor Tribe is struggling with the 
current state of constitutional law, and then discuss why Tribe‘s difficulties 
represent an important moment in our constitutional history. 
I. A DESCRIPTIVE ACCOUNT OF THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION 
A. The Transparent Ideas 
The first three quarters of The Invisible Constitution are devoted in 
large part to demonstrating why the Constitution of the United States cannot 
be understood by simply reading its text.  Although this conclusion is ac-
cepted by virtually everyone who reads and studies constitutional law (as a 
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ing the Constitution ―invisible,‖ he is saying something different than if he 
said there is an ―unwritten‖ Constitution.  Yet, if the word ―invisible‖ were 
replaced by the word ―unwritten‖ every time it appears in his book, the 
meaning would not change, although some of Tribe‘s arguments would 
make more sense, and he wouldn‘t have to overstate his case.  For example, 
he begins his argument that we have an ―invisible‖ Constitution by suggest-
ing that there are many essential constitutional postulates that cannot be 
gleaned from its text or derived by standard legal argument.  These unstated 
principles include the following: 
 
  ―Ours is a ‗government of laws, not men.‘‖ 
  ―We are committed to the ‗rule of law.‘‖ 
  ―In each person‘s intimate private life, there are limits to 
what government may control.‖ 
  ―Congress may not commandeer states as though they 
were agencies or departments of the federal govern-
ment.‖ 
  ―No state may secede from the Union.‖9 
 
According to Professor Tribe, the ―apparent detachment and distance 
from the Constitution‘s text does not prevent any of these propositions from 
being identified by nearly everyone as binding elements of our nation‘s su-
preme law.‖10  Of course, the first two propositions are so vague as to be 
difficult to apply to any concrete constitutional problem, and the fourth is 
contestable enough that at least four Supreme Court Justices would argue 
that it is simply not true that the federal government is constitutionally pro-
hibited from commandeering the states.11   
In any event, it is the last of Tribe‘s ―constitutional postulates‖ that is 
the most revealing about his ―invisible,‖ or in common parlance, ―unwrit-
ten‖ Constitution.  Apparently, Tribe believes that the Constitution prohibits 
states from seceding from the Union—though that proposition ―is written 
not in ink but in blood.‖12  Whether there really is a constitutional prescrip-
tion that states cannot secede is certainly an interesting question.13  Such a 
rule cannot be found in the document‘s text, which is of course Professor 
Tribe‘s point.  But what exactly does it mean to say that there is a constitu-





  Id. at 28. 
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cult one.  Any state planning to secede would probably not consider the 
Constitution binding, and certainly no Court decision would deter such a 
state.  So does our Constitution prohibit governmental decisions most of us 
would find unimaginable, even without any possible link to text and even 
though such a prohibition probably could not be enforced under the rule of 
law?  And how do we find such ―invisible‖ propositions?  Admittedly, 
Tribe is more interested in making the point that nontextual constitutional 
rules exist than in defining their substance and enforcement mechanisms, 
but exploring these questions would have been useful to the reader. 
The inclusion of an ―anti-secession‖ principle in Tribe‘s Invisible Con-
stitution poses another difficulty with his thesis.  Tribe states early on that 
his book is not about what role the Supreme Court or other governmental 
actors should play in interpreting the Constitution.14  Instead, his ―main fo-
cus‖ is on the ―invisible, nontextual foundations and facets of that Constitu-
tion.‖15  Implicit in many of Tribe‘s arguments is the idea that everything 
that is unthinkable (a state seceding) is unconstitutional.  The problem is 
that there may be many governmental acts, such as intrusions on sexual pri-
vacy or torture of alleged terrorists, that many people consider morally 
wrong but not necessarily unconstitutional.  Tribe does not even hint at this 
possibility, but it becomes a major stumbling block later in the book when 
he tries to explain how he would discover what is and what is not unconsti-
tutional.  Since Tribe suggests that the answer is not derived from text, his-
tory, structure, or precedent, how do we as a society try to draw the line 
between the unthinkable and the unconstitutional?  A fair reading of the 
book is that there is simply no difference.  If that is true, however, Tribe 
should have said so explicitly, and he should have discussed the implica-
tions of such a novel view for those governmental actors who are called 
upon to discover the Invisible Constitution.  Unfortunately, this discussion 
is nowhere in the book. 
Throughout his descriptive account, Tribe repeats again and again that 
what the Constitution means cannot be gleaned from its text but instead 
―resides only in much that one cannot perceive from reading it.‖16  But 
questions such as who in the government has legal authority to see this In-
visible Constitution and how Justices ―ready to kill one another over the 
visible text will ever reach agreement about an unseen one‖17 are left un-
answered.  What the reader is left with are Tribe‘s descriptive statements 
that doctrines such as substantive due process (which he says is antitextual) 
and judicial interpretations of the First Amendment that go well beyond its 
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tution.  This reader‘s response to Tribe‘s lengthy attempt to establish that 
proposition was a big ―So what?‖  As mentioned earlier, this point has been 
made persuasively before.18 
B. The Opaque Ideas 
As over the top as this criticism sounds, there is so much in The Invisi-
ble Constitution that can‘t be taken seriously as an explication of constitu-
tional law that the only fair approach is to allow Professor Tribe to speak 
for himself.  The context of the quotations below is Tribe‘s belief that the 
true Constitution of the United States cannot be found by reading its text or 
the Supreme Court‘s constitutional decisions but instead must be found by 
looking, in Tribe‘s own words, at its ―dark matter.‖19  Although Professor 
Tribe implies in the beginning of the book that he is writing for everyone, 
not just lawyers and constitutional law scholars,20 much of his prose is diffi-
cult to understand.  As a reviewer for the New York Times observed, 
―Tribe‘s opaque sentences make ‗the invisible‘ even harder to see.‖21  Here 
are a few representative samples of this difficult-to-understand prose: 
 
So the visible Constitution necessarily floats in a vast 
and deep—and, crucially, invisible—ocean of ideas, propo-
sitions, recovered memories, and imagined experiences that 
the Constitution as a whole puts us in a position to 
glimpse.22 
 
* * * 
 
How the Constitution‘s ―invisible‖ rules and rights are 
to be elaborated is a question amenable in the first instance 
less to theory than to observation.  I would identify six dis-
tinct but overlapping modes of construction in forming the 
invisible Constitution: geometric, geodesic, global, geolog-
ical, gravitational, and gyroscopic. . . .  [T]he fact that my 
list of methods has ended up being organized around the 
letter ―g‖ will doubtless alert the reader at the very start that 
my aesthetic sense at times leads me to succumb to the al-






  See, e.g., Grey, supra note 6; Sherry, supra note 7. 
19
  See TRIBE, supra note 8, at 171. 
20
  See id. at xxi. 
21
  Tara McKelvey, The Invisible Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2008, at BR 22 (book review) 
(link). 
22
  See TRIBE, supra note 8, at 9. 
23
  Id. at 155–56. 
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* * * 
 
The need to answer [constitutional] questions like 
these, combined with the silence of the text, again demon-
strates the unavoidable existence of a large body of ―dark 
matter‖ that constitutes the Constitution‘s all-important set 
of  ―invisible‖ structures and principles.  And the geometric 
mode of construction represents not some magic key with 
which to unlock the secret of that dark matter but merely 
the simplest way to organize its points, lines, and planes in-
to culturally meaningful forms—forms akin to the constel-
lations the ancients superimposed on the starry sky.24 
 
Tribe ends the book with this quotation a friend of his read in a fortune 
cookie: ―‗Everything that we see is a shadow cast by that which we do not 
see.‘‖25 
These excerpts typify much of Tribe‘s discussion about constitutional 
interpretation.  His space references do not add clarity, and this reader at 
least tired of them rather quickly.  In addition, even when Professor Tribe is 
not employing metaphors to make his points, his discussion can be confus-
ing.  He says that his ―interest is less in what‘s invisible ‗around‘ the Con-
stitution than in what is invisible within it,‖26 and that his ―hope is to nudge 
the nation‘s constitutional conversation away from debates over what the 
Constitution says . . . and toward debates over what the Constitution 
does.‖27  These distinctions are never adequately fleshed out by Tribe, and 
the difference between what is ―around‖ the Constitution and what is ―with-
in‖ it is difficult to grasp, and how a Constitution can ―do‖ anything eluded 
this reader completely.  Moreover, I found myself asking silly little ques-
tions like ―Can an ‗invisible‘ Constitution have anything ‗within‘ it?‖ and 
―Wouldn‘t it be easier to find an ‗anti-cloaking‘ device than to try to under-
stand Tribe‘s effort to illuminate the ‗invisible?‘‖28 
In any event, the reader eventually nears the last quarter of the book 
and encounters Tribe‘s six g‘s of Constitutional interpretation (the geome-
tric, geodesic, global, geological, gravitational, and gyroscopic) and six co-
lorful and abstract (at best) pictures of each ―g.‖29  Without reproducing the 
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to decipher each method of constitutional interpretation.30  As one reviewer 
has already pointed out, the ―craggy rocks and shady cliffs evoke ‗The Lord 
of the Rings‘ more than legal principles.‖31  To this reader, the pictures 
looked more like outer space and the pyramids, but of course art is subjec-
tive.  The point is that the pictures fail to make transparent the six g‘s.  In 
Tribe‘s defense, it may be that he intended these pictures to be more artistic 
than explanatory, as he admits that they are ―presented as [he] created them 
rather than in a professional rendition, in the belief that any resulting reduc-
tion in clarity will be more than offset by the gains in vibrancy and imme-
diacy.‖32  Where all of this properly falls in a book about nontextual consti-
constitutional interpretation is a bit mystifying. 
So the reader moves forward and learns that the first ―g,‖ ―geometric 
construction,‖ means ―‗connecting the dots‘ and ‗extending the lines,‘‖33 
and that the last ―g,‖ ―gyroscopic construction,‖ is the idea that:  
 
[J]ust as a spinning gyroscope . . . is governed by vectors of 
force that give it stability and enable it to resist gravitation-
al pulls that would otherwise knock it off its axis of spin, so 
the Constitution embodies vector forces both centripetal 
(pulling toward the center) and centrifugal (pulling out-
ward) that ensure a measure of stability.34   
 
In between is more of the same, combined with normative justifica-
tions for various legal results Tribe advocates, and the reader feels that he 
has been knocked of his ―axis of spin‖ himself, and could desperately use 
some traditional constitutional tools like precedent or history to restore his 
―stability.‖  And this reaction comes from a reviewer who is a devout legal 
realist and skeptic, and who believes that the results of constitutional inter-
pretation at the Supreme Court level of decision making is nothing more 
and nothing less than the aggregate subjective value preferences of each 
Justice.35 
In sum, Tribe‘s descriptive account of constitutional law, where trans-
parent, persuasively but unoriginally demonstrates that we have a robust 
unwritten Constitution.  Where his descriptive account is original, it is 
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  See McKelvey, supra note 21. 
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  See TRIBE, supra note 8, at 156. 
33
  Id. at 157. 
34
  Id. at 207. 
35
  See Eric J. Segall, The Black Holes of American Constitutional Law, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 425, 
444–45 (2000) (reviewing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed. 1999)). 
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examines Tribe‘s normative justifications for the ―invisible‖ constitutional 
propositions he supports. 
II. THE NORMATIVE (OR MAKING THE INVISIBLE VISIBLE) 
Although most of Tribe‘s book is devoted to demonstrating that we 
have an Invisible Constitution, he also spends considerable effort trying to 
justify both the Court‘s substantive due process privacy decisions and its 
abandonment of Lochner and its progeny.36  It is somewhat unclear whether 
he embarks on this journey to illustrate how the six g‘s might apply to par-
ticular cases or whether he has an interest in privileging particular constitu-
tional results.  Either way, Tribe fails to persuasively argue that his six g‘s 
are an improvement over the traditional methods of constitutional interpre-
tation. 
Tribe begins this section by referring to the actual text of the Constitu-
tion (that which we can see).  He relies on the Ninth Amendment to support 
the notion that ―[w]hatever else‖ the Amendment might mean, it ―cautions 
against any reading of the rights ‗enumerated‘ in the Bill of Rights that 
would treat those rights as a comprehensive and exhaustive list.‖37  He then 
argues that because the First Amendment protects freedom of speech and 
the right to peacefully assemble, and because the Fourth Amendment pro-
tects the right of the people to be secure in their persons and homes from 
unreasonable searches and seizures, that:  
 
[T]here is a strong case for treating as presumptively pro-
tected from government the choices adult individuals make 
about the identity of those with whom they share their 
homes and lives, and the details (anatomical and otherwise) 
of the ways they choose to interact expressively in their 
homes with other consenting adults.38   
 
All of this is in the service of justifying Griswold v. Connecticut,39 
Lawrence v. Texas,40 and other decisions invalidating governmental efforts 
to interfere with private sexual decisions between consenting adults.  
There are several problems with Tribe‘s efforts to justify the Court‘s 
privacy and substantive due process decisions.  First, Tribe offers no re-
sponse to Justice Scalia‘s dissenting opinion in Lawrence.  Scalia argues 





  Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (overturning state law regulating hours of bakery em-
ployees on substantive due process grounds). 
37
  See TRIBE, supra note 8, at 161. 
38
  Id. at 162. 
39
  381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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  539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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prohibiting consensual adult incest, bigamy, prostitution, and most other 
morals-based legislation.41  Perhaps Tribe believes such laws would violate 
some combination of the First, Fourth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments, 
but he doesn‘t say and the reader is left wondering.  Scalia‘s objections me-
rit some kind of response if Lawrence is going to be defended as an exam-
ple of proper constitutional interpretation. 
Tribe‘s failure to address Scalia‘s objections to Lawrence is especially 
problematic because, unlike several eminent scholars, Tribe specifically 
disavows any general libertarian presumption against governmental action.  
This disavowal, however, is directed at a straw man (or perhaps, in keeping 
with the spirit of the book, a ghost).  After defending a robust right to priva-
cy, Tribe argues that some scholars (specifically referring in the endnotes to 
Randy Barnett and Richard Epstein)42 have tried to use the Ninth Amend-
ment and other constitutional text to adopt ―a broadly libertarian premise 
that no branch or level of government may restrict any aspect of anyone‘s 
freedom of action without a demonstrably ‗good‘ reason rooted in the safety 
or welfare of others and, even then, going no further than good reason de-
mands.‖43  Tribe‘s response to this position is that it could mean either that 
the government would be restricted ―far more than anyone appears to have 
envisioned when voting to ratify the relevant constitutional provisions,‖ or 
it might ―restrict government hardly at all, which is an outcome we should 
expect if courts and others chose to give government an enormously wide 
berth in identifying impacts on the welfare of others . . . .‖44  Both out-
comes, Tribe argues, would result in a Constitution that cannot meaningful-
ly distinguish between: 
 
[T]rivial and fundamental encroachments on the shape of 
people‘s lives.  Requiring people to drive on the right side 
of the road . . . would become essentially indistinguishable 
from demanding that they worship only as the majority of 
their fellow citizens worship . . . or that they bear exactly 
the number of children the majority deems optimal.45 
 
Tribe‘s suggestion that the immense body of work authored by Epstein 
and Barnett on the Constitution‘s libertarian presumption would equate traf-
fic rules with restrictions on religious worship is unpersuasive and perhaps 
even a bit demeaning to those two scholars.  Moreover, Tribe‘s example of 





  Id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  The majority had found that mere disapproval of a particular 
practice on moral grounds cannot be a rational basis for criminalizing that practice.  See id. at 577–78 
(majority opinion). 
42
  See TRIBE, supra note 8, at 228. 
43
  Id. at 166. 
44
  Id. at 166–67. 
45
  Id. at 167. 
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Amendment would prohibit such governmental action.46  The fact is that 
Tribe‘s own analysis, fairly read, could support a strong libertarian pre-
sumption contained within, or around, or radiating above, our Invisible 
Constitution.  His three-paragraph refutation of that possibility is uncon-
vincing. 
After ducking the logical implications of his justification for a strong, 
unenumerated right to privacy, Tribe tries to explain why privacy is privi-
leged by the Invisible Constitution while freedom of contract is not.  He 
concedes that one could certainly take Article I, Section 10‘s prohibition on 
laws impairing the obligations of contracts,47 the Fifth Amendment‘s ban on 
taking private property without just compensation,48 and the Fourteenth 
Amendment‘s prohibition on taking property without due process of law,49 
and construct a scheme of constitutional rights similar to the ones protected 
by Lochner and its progeny.50  He then suggests, however, that the problem 
with ―Lochnerizing,‖ and what ―ultimately distinguishes Lochner from the 
contemporary line of privacy decisions,‖ is that the Lochner rationale was 
―insufficiently attentive to the dynamics of power that rendered ostensibly 
self-governing relationships of employer to employee or of producer to 
consumer hollow forms that concealed what were, at bottom, unilateral im-
positions of power.‖51  He concludes this line of reasoning by arguing that: 
 
To employ ―liberty of contract‖ rhetoric to prevent regula-
tion of wages and working conditions in settings where 
lawmakers have plausibly found that severe inequalities of 
bargaining power exist would be akin to employing ―sexual 
intimacy‖ rhetoric and the trope of ―privacy‖ to prevent 
regulations of sex harassment of employees in the 
workplace or rape of wives by their husbands in abusive 
marital relationships.52 
 
Tribe‘s response to the argument that governmental regulation of pri-
vate economic relationships should be presumptively unconstitutional de-
monstrates the inevitably subjective nature of his reasoning.  First, 





  U.S. CONST. amend. I (―Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .‖). 
47
  U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10 (―No state shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law 
impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . . .‖). 
48
  U.S. CONST. amend. V (―[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just com-
pensation.‖). 
49
  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (―No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law . . . .‖). 
50
  See TRIBE, supra note 8, at 168–69. 
51
  Id. at 169. 
52
  Id. at 169–70. 
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ernment today regulates economic relationships only when it has ―plausi-
bly‖ found that there are ―severe inequalities‖ of bargaining power between 
employer and employee or producer and consumer is to blind oneself to the 
realities of current economic legislation, and to the Court‘s almost complete 
deference to the government‘s power to dictate the terms of private con-
tracts and other economic arrangements.  Second, even where there are 
gross inequalities of bargaining power, there are both textual and nontextual 
foundations for a right to contract despite such inequalities.  No such analo-
gy can possibly be made to support the rights of sexual harassers, much less 
the rights of men who rape their wives.  To offer such analogies is to abdi-
cate all hope of reasoned argument. 
Even under Tribe‘s own reasoning, the privacy and economic rights 
cases are much more difficult to distinguish than Tribe would have the 
reader believe.  When justifying the privacy cases under his ―gravitational‖ 
mode of constitutional interpretation, Tribe uses an ―anti-slippery-slope‖ 
argument.53  In keeping with the overall tone of his book, however, Tribe 
moves from the slope to the sky to ask the following question: ―Formulat-
ing legal principles with a view to the black holes into which they might 
threaten to plunge all who come too close . . . is a method that insists on 
taking proposed rules and principles to their logical conclusions—on asking 
where following them would risk leading the surrounding society.‖54  
Therefore, according to Tribe, if the government were allowed to ―dictate 
which forms of sexual gratification are lawful between consenting adults in 
the privacy of their homes . . . a gravitational analysis would necessarily 
ask: Would there remain any limits at all on how closely government could 
regiment every last detail of personal life?‖55  If the government could regu-
late consenting oral sex among homosexuals, Tribe asks, why not ―deep 
kissing or mutual masturbation or even tender consolation in identical cir-
cumstances?‖56  An answer, for those who think Lawrence was wrongly de-
cided, might be that there is no tradition in this country of banning kissing 
or tender consolation, whereas there is a long (and unfortunate) history of 
criminalizing consensual sodomy.  But leaving that critique aside, Tribe‘s 
gravitational analysis could be applied with similar effect to private consen-
sual economic arrangements.  If the government can tell a small business 
what minimum wage it must pay its employees, or dictate the terms of over-
time arrangements to any firm operating in interstate commerce, what is to 
stop the government from dictating all aspects of the employer-employee 
relationship, such as the precise salaries to be paid all employees, mandato-
ry overtime requirements, or the maximum number of people to be hired for 
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numerous constitutional provisions as well as much of our tradition and his-
tory.  Apparently, Professor Tribe is concerned about the black holes of 
personal privacy but not the black holes of economic freedom.  Fine, but he 
should not pretend that the Invisible Constitution privileges one form of 
privacy but not the other (at least not for the ―gravitational‖ reasons he pro-
vides). 
The remainder of The Invisible Constitution is devoted to justifying a 
number of liberal doctrines and a few conservative ones.  For example, un-
der his ―global‖ mode of analysis, Professor Tribe approves of Justice Ken-
nedy‘s and the Court‘s uses of international norms in cases like Lawrence v. 
Texas and Roper v. Simmons.57  At least in this chapter the connection be-
tween his ―g‖ and the results he favors is rather obvious—global means 
global.58  He also thinks that Reynolds v. Sims‘s ―one person one vote‖ rule59 
is a good idea,60 as is the public figure rule for defamation of New York 
Times v. Sullivan.61  Approving some results on the right, Professor Tribe 
justifies the Court‘s decision in United States v. Lopez,62 which invalidated 
the prohibition of guns around schools, under the ―gravitational‖ mode.63  
He fails to discuss, however, the later decided Raich case,64 which to many 
seems to undo much of what Lopez stands for.65  In any event, these discus-
sions have little to do with the Invisible Constitution, and simply reflect 
Professor Tribe‘s personal value judgments about what the Constitution 
should and should not mean (or do).  By the time the reader finishes reading 
these normative justifications, she might have the sense that they belonged 
more in a new version of his treatise advocating his vision of the Constitu-
tion66 than in a book about the ―geological‖ and ―gravitational‖ modes of 
constitutional interpretation. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CONFUSION 
Nine years ago, I reviewed the Third Edition of Volume I of Professor 
Tribe‘s famous treatise on constitutional law. 67  I argued that Tribe‘s work 
reflected much of what is wrong with constitutional doctrine because 
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history, structure, and precedent to decide and/or solve hard constitutional 
law cases.68  I also suggested that Tribe should stop trying to make doctrinal 
sense of constitutional law and should instead focus more on identifying 
those forces that actually generate results in difficult Supreme Court cases.69  
A few years later (though I am not suggesting any causal relation) Tribe 
dramatically announced to the world in a public letter to Justice Breyer, and 
in a rather long letter to the Green Bag, that he would not publish the 
second volume of his treatise (or do any work supplementing the treatise), 
at least partly because ―the reality is that I do not have, nor do I believe I 
have seen, a vision capacious and convincing enough to propound as an or-
ganizing principle for the next phase in the law of our Constitution.‖70  A 
fair reading of his thirteen-page letter to the Green Bag suggests a person 
sincerely grappling with the current state of constitutional doctrine and 
scholarship. 
In his letter, Professor Tribe also said that no treatise true to that form 
could answer the following critical question: ―[I]f not dictated by the text, 
where does one‘s set of criteria for better or worse readings, or ways of 
reading, constitutional text come from?  And who ratified the meta-
constitution that such external criteria would comprise?‖71  Apparently, The 
Invisible Constitution is Tribe‘s most recent attempt to deal with that diffi-
cult question.  Unfortunately, as I hope this Review has suggested, helpful 
answers to the many problems with what I will call constitutional confusion 
do not lie in outer space and/or geodesic methods of constitutional interpre-
tation.  I believe Professor Tribe is running away from the following inevit-
able starting place for any helpful analysis of our unwritten Constitution 
and from its implications for a strong system of judicial review by un-
elected judges: constitutional law in the most important and controversial 
cases is mostly about the give and take of the subjective value judgments of 
the Justices.  It is not always about politics—Republicans versus Democrats 
or liberals versus conservatives—but it is always about values.  The Invisi-
ble Constitution‘s inability to persuasively argue otherwise is further evi-
dence of that inescapable fact.   
In our post-realist world, some academics (and judges with an academ-
ic bent, such as Judge Posner) are trying to reconcile the large role subjec-
tivity plays in Supreme Court decisions with the rule of law, but few 
(Posner is an exception) teach, write, or judge with that question in mind.  
When considering the numerous questions related to Supreme Court inter-
pretation of vague phrases, such as due process and equal protection, where 
precedent hardly matters and there is no legislative override, the place to 
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tween the results in Bowers and Lawrence, Usery and Garcia, Garcia and 
Printz, and Roe, Casey, Stenberg, and Gonzales v. Carhart,72 have little to 
do with text, history, structure, or precedent and everything to do with Jus-
tice Blackmun changing his mind in Garcia, Justice Kennedy‘s personal 
agenda to overturn Bowers, and the substitution on the Court of Justice Ali-
to for Justice O‘Connor.  
 I don‘t yet have good answers to Professor Tribe‘s important question 
about nontextual constitutional interpretation, but I do know they don‘t re-
side in black holes or craggy cliffs.  When a constitutional lawyer as impor-
tant and talented as Professor Tribe cannot meaningfully advance the debate 
over proper constitutional analysis, something must be dreadfully wrong 
with the state of constitutional law and constitutional scholarship.  It is only 
when scholars and judges truly recognize the reality of value choice and the 
role of preferences by individual Justices that we can get back on the right 
track (or planet).  Maybe, just maybe, Professor Tribe had to leave us far 
behind to show us where we need to go.  That may well be the inevitable 
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